Introduction
To weigh truth requires empty scales
In our journey through the study of Fiqh, this gentle wisdom offers a valuable reminder. When we encounter complex topics, there's a natural tendency to lean toward positions we've already embraced. Yet true understanding invites us to momentarily set aside our existing views, creating space to carefully examine both supporting and opposing arguments with equal attention - to be objective in our understanding without having any confirmation bias.
Building on this approach, our previous articles explored various sources of Islamic law, including the fundamental sources like Quran, Sunnah, and Ijma. We then turned our focus to Qiyas, which you can read about in detail in our last article.
Now, in this article, we will examine the scholarly debate surrounding Qiyas. While most classical scholars accept Qiyas as a valid tool, critics like the Ẓāhirī school reject it entirely. This article examines both perspectives, evaluates their evidence, and clarifies how this debate shapes Islamic Fiqh.
Understanding the Proponents and Opponents of Qiyas
Proponents of Qiyas
The majority of Muslim scholars throughout history have accepted Qiyas as a valid source of Islamic law. Proponents of Qiyas are found across the four major Sunni schools of jurisprudence - Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali - albeit with varying degrees of emphasis and application. The Hanafi school is particularly known for its extensive use of Qiyas, the reasons for which we had discussed in our previous post.
These scholars view Qiyas as a necessary methodological tool for the continuation and adaptability of Islamic law across different times, places, and circumstances. They argue that not every new situation that Muslims encounter can be directly addressed through explicit texts from the Quran and Sunnah. Therefore, Qiyas provides a systematic way to extend established principles to novel cases by identifying the underlying rationales of existing rulings.
Opponents of Qiyas
The Ẓāhiris were a group of 'ulamā' (scholars) known for their strict commitment to the apparent (ẓāhir) meanings of the Qur'an and Sunnah. Most notably represented by Ibn Ḥazm of al-Andalus, they rejected Qiyās (analogical reasoning) and other forms of speculative legal tools. Instead, they insisted that only what is explicitly stated in the nusūs (texts) can be considered valid for deriving ahkām shar'iyyah (legal rulings).
While they are often labeled as “literalists,” the Ẓāhiris were more methodical than that label suggests. In fact, Ibn Ḥazm himself was clear that Ẓāhiriyyah was not ḥarfiyyah—a rigid literalism that ignores language and context—but rather textualism grounded in the rules of Arabic and the apparent meaning intended by the text. For example, in his commentary on the verse “And into their hearts the calf was made to sink because of their kufr” (Qur’an 2:93), Ibn Ḥazm explains that this doesn’t mean the calf physically sank into their hearts, but rather that the love of the calf was embedded in their hearts. (Ibn Hazm, al-Ihkaam fee Usool al-Ahkaam, vol 1 p 416)
A central point of divergence between the Ẓāhiris and other madhhabs (schools of jurisprudence) was their rejection of the rational derivation of the ʿillah (effective cause) behind ahkām (rulings). Where other fuqahā' (jurists) would attempt to uncover the underlying hikmah (wisdom) or rationale of a command and extend it to similar cases through Qiyās, the Ẓāhiris refused to go beyond what was textually stated. In their view, the ʿillah must itself be explicitly mentioned in the nusūs—if it isn't, it cannot serve as the basis for new ahkām.
This can be seen in examples such as:
- The verse on inheritance: “Allah instructs you concerning your children...” (Qur’an 4:11) is not applied to slaves or grandsons (when a son exists), based on established Ijmāʿ.
- Or the verse: “Verily, the people (pagans) have gathered against you...” (Qur’an 3:173), which cannot be taken to mean every single person literally said that—this is known through clear context and experience.
As a school of thought, the Ẓāhiris did not view themselves as a madhhab in the same sense as the Ḥanafīs or Mālikīs. Ibn Ḥazm, for instance, refers to them as Ashābunā (“our companions”) or Ashāb al-Ẓāhir, emphasizing that what united them was not a formal structure but a shared commitment to a methodological principle. He even respectfully disagreed with Dawood al-Ẓāhirī on several issues, underscoring that intellectual independence remained a core value of the school.
You can find more details about this discussion (with exact references) in one of our books published.
Dr. Syed Nooruzuha Barmaver
Evidence from the Quran Supporting Qiyas
1. The Command to "Take a Lesson" (Fa'tabiru)
The Proponents' View: The first evidence from the Quran that scholars bring to validate Qiyas is from Surah Al-Hashr:
فَاعْتَبِرُوا يَا أُولِي الْأَبْصَارِ
"So take a lesson from this, O people of insight." (Quran 59:2)
According to proponents, the command "I‘tabiru" (take a lesson) comes from the root word "Ubur," that means "crossing over" or "moving from one place to another." They argue that the use of the imperative form in this verse indicates that we should cross over from an original situation to a new situation - which is essentially what Qiyas does.
In Qiyas, we identify an original situation with a clear ruling, determine the reason for that ruling, and then apply the same ruling to a new situation that shares the same reason. The proponents see this verse as a proof to apply this methodology.
The Opponents' View: Those who oppose Qiyas, notably Ibn Hazm and other scholars of the Zahiri school, strongly refute this interpretation. Ibn Hazm argues that this interpretation is misguided and that the word "I‘tabiru" simply means "take a lesson" - not "do Qiyas."
Ibn Hazm proceeds to satirically refute this notion, highlighting that if their misguided interpretation were the true meaning of the verb, it would absurdly imply a directive for Muslims to demolish their own homes, akin to the actions of disbelievers. This alleged command embedded in the verb "i‘tabiru" occurred in the following saying of Allah: “so they destroyed their houses with their own hands and the hands of the believers” (Quran 59:2)
To support his argument, Ibn Hazm points to the full context of the verse:
"It is He who expelled the disbelievers of the People of the Book from their homes at the first gathering. You did not think they would leave, and they thought their fortresses would protect them from Allah; but Allah came to them from where they had not expected, and He cast terror into their hearts. They destroyed their houses by their own hands and the hands of the believers. So take a lesson ˹from this˺, O people of insight." (Quran 59:2)
Ibn Hazm notes that the verse is describing a historical event where Allah's punishment came to a group of people, and they ended up destroying their own houses. In this context, He argues that when the Quran was revealed, the Arabic word "i'tabiru" was not used to mean "do Qiyas," but rather "take a lesson.".
Ibn Hazm further points out that throughout the Quran, all derivatives of the root word of "i‘tabiru" consistently mean "to learn a lesson" - not to make analogies between different legal cases. Based on this observation, Ibn Hazm delves into an exploration of linguistic nuances, aiming to demonstrate that the concept of ”Qiyas" as later understood by people of Qiyas did not exist in the pre-Islamic Arabic language or in the Qur'an during the early Islamic era.
(Ibn Hazm in Mulakhass Ibtal al-Qiyas wa-al-Ray wa-al-Istihan wa al-Taqleed wa al-Taleel p.27-28)
2. The Concept of Investigation (Istinbat)
The Proponents' View: Another Quranic evidence cited by proponents of Qiyas comes from Surah An-Nisa:
Had they referred it to the Messenger and to those having authority among them, the truth of the matter would have come to the knowledge of those of them who are able to investigate [yastanbitunahu] " (Quran 4:83)
Proponents focus on the word "yastanbitunahu" (investigate/derive). They argue that this word refers to the use of wisdom and reasoning to discover truth and reality, which they see as an indication supporting the validity of Qiyas.
The Opponents' View: Scholars who oppose Qiyas argue that this interpretation misunderstands the context of the verse. They point to the historical background of this revelation, which concerned a rumor that was circulating among some hypocrites (munafiqeen) and uninformed Muslims that the Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ) had divorced all his wives.
According to an authentic hadith in Sahih Bukhari and Sahih Muslim, when Umar was informed that the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) divorced his wives, he came from his house, entered the Masjid and found the people talking about this news. He could not wait and went to the Prophet (ﷺ) to ask him about what had truly happened, asking him, "Have you divorced your wives'' The Prophet (ﷺ) said, "No”.Umar said, "I said, Allahu Akbar...'' and mentioned the rest of the Hadith. In the narration that Muslim collected, `Umar said, "I asked, `Have you divorced them' He said, `No. So, I stood by the door of the Masjid and shouted with the loudest voice, The Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) did not divorce his wives.' Then, this Ayah was revealed. So I properly investigated that matter.'' This Ayah refers to proper investigation, or extraction of matters from their proper resources. (Tafseer Ibn Kathir)
The opponents argue that the verse is therefore endorsing proper investigation from authentic sources - not analogical reasoning. The term "yastanbitunahu" refers to extracting accurate information through the proper channels of inquiry, not deriving new rulings through comparison with existing ones.
3. Extension of Prohibitions
The Proponents' View: Proponents of Qiyas also point to verses that prohibit specific items and explain how Qiyas extends these prohibitions. For example, in Surah Al-Ma'idah:
Say, “I do not find, in what has been revealed to me, anything prohibited for anyone who eats it, unless it be carrion or blood that pours forth, or flesh of swine - because it is (Rijs) impure (Quran 6:145)
They argue that the verse explicitly mentions "lahm al-khinzir" (the flesh/meat of swine), but through Qiyas, they extend this prohibition to include the fat of swine as well. Similarly, while the verse uses the male form of the noun, they apply the prohibition to female pigs too through analogical reasoning.
The Opponents' View: Ibn Hazm and others who oppose Qiyas argue that this is not a valid example of Qiyas but rather a proper understanding of the Arabic language. Ibn Hazm contends that the fat of pork is not prohibited through Qiyas but through direct textual understanding of the context.
He points out that the verse describes swine as "rijs" (impure/filthy), a descriptor that applies to the entire animal, not just its flesh. According to principles of Arabic grammar, when an adjective follows multiple nouns, it most directly modifies the nearest noun - in this case, "swine" rather than just "flesh."
Furthermore, as for the prohibition related to the sow, Ibn Hazm maintains that this prohibition is included directly in the word swine, because the Arabic word used for swine (khinzeer) is a generic noun standing for the whole species which includes both male and female.
(Ibn Hazm in Mulakhass Ibtal al-Qiyas wa-al-Ray wa-al-Istihan wa al-Taqleed wa al-Taleel p.24, 31-32)
Arguments from the Quran Against Qiyas
Opponents of Qiyas cite several Quranic verses to support their position:
1. The Completeness and Perfection of the Religion
"We have not neglected anything in the Book." (Quran 6:38)
"Today I have perfected your religion for you, completed My favor upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion." (Quran 5:3)
"And We have revealed to you the Book as an explanation for all things." (Quran 16:89)
"And We have sent down to you the Reminder that you may explain to people what has been revealed to them." (Quran 16:44)
Based on these verses, opponents of Qiyas argue that since Allah has declared the religion to be complete and the Quran to be comprehensive, there is no need for additional methods like Qiyas to derive rulings.
The Response of Qiyas Proponents: Those who support Qiyas respond that these general verses do not negate the validity of Qiyas. They argue that Qiyas itself is derived from the Quran and Sunnah and is simply a tool to apply the principles found in these primary sources to new situations. Qiyas does not add to the religion; rather, it extends existing principles to new circumstances.
As they explain, when something new emerges that was not directly addressed in the Quran and Sunnah, Qiyas allows scholars to derive rulings based on similar cases that were addressed in the primary texts. This is not adding to the religion but implementing its principles in a systematic way.
Evidence from the Sunnah Supporting Qiyas
1. The Hadith of Mu'adh ibn Jabal
The Proponents' View: A commonly cited hadith in support of Qiyas is the report of Mu'adh ibn Jabal, who was sent by the Prophet (ﷺ) to Yemen as a judge:
Some companions of Mu'adh ibn Jabal said: When the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) intended to send Mu'adh ibn Jabal to the Yemen, he asked: How will you judge when the occasion of deciding a case arises?
He replied: I shall judge in accordance with Allah's Book. He asked: (What will you do) if you do not find any guidance in Allah's Book? He replied: (I shall act) in accordance with the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ).
He asked: (What will you do) if you do not find any guidance in the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) and in Allah's Book?
He replied: I shall do my best to form an opinion and I shall spare no effort.
The Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) then patted him on the breast and said: Praise be to Allah Who has helped the messenger of the Messenger of Allah to find something which pleases the Messenger of Allah. (Sunan Abi Dawud 3592)
Proponents argue that the Prophet's approval of Mu'adh's methodology, which included personal reasoning (ijtihad) when the primary texts did not provide direct guidance, implicitly endorses processes like Qiyas.
The Opponents' View: Critics classify this hadith as "munkar" (rejected) based on evaluations by numerous hadith scholars including Al-Bukhari, Al-Tirmidhi, Al-Daraqutni, Al-Uqayli, Ibn Hazm, Ibn Al-Jawzi, Al-Dhahabi, Abdul Haq Ishbili, and Ibn Hajar. Sheikh Al-Albani, in his book "Silsilat Al-Ahadith Al-Da'ifah," no. 881 provided a detailed explanation of why this hadith is weak.
According to the principles of hadith evaluation, a hadith with such deficiencies cannot serve as a basis for establishing a fundamental principle of Islamic jurisprudence like Qiyas.
2. Qiyas in Prophetic Responses
The Proponents' View: Advocates of Qiyas point to instances where the Prophet (ﷺ) himself appeared to employ analogical reasoning. Two notable examples involve religious obligations for deceased persons:
Example 1: The Hadith about Hajj on behalf of a deceased mother:
"Ibn Abbas reported that a woman from the tribe of Juhayna came to the Prophet (ﷺ) and said: 'My mother had vowed to perform Hajj but died before performing it. May I perform Hajj on her behalf?' He replied: 'Yes, perform Hajj on her behalf. Had there been a debt on your mother, would you have paid it? Pay Allah's debt, for Allah has more right to be paid.'" (Sahih al-Bukhari 1852)
Example 2: The Hadith about fasting on behalf of a deceased person:
"Ibn Abbas reported that a woman came to the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) and said: 'My mother has died and fasts of a month are due from her.' Thereupon he said: 'If debt was due from her, would you pay it?' She said: 'Yes.' He then said: 'The debt of Allah deserves its payment more than (the payment of anyone else).'" (Sahih Muslim 1148)
Proponents argue that in both cases, the Prophet (ﷺ) compared religious obligations (Hajj and fasting) to financial debts, thereby employing a form of Qiyas. According to their view, the Prophet was comparing an original case (debt to people) with a new case (religious obligation) based on a shared characteristic.
The Opponents' View: Scholars who oppose Qiyas offer a different interpretation of these hadiths. They argue that the Prophet (ﷺ) did not engage in personal reasoning to arrive at these rulings, but rather conveyed revelation from Allah. As the Quran states: "He does not speak from his own desire; it is only a revelation revealed" (53:3-4).
They contend that the Prophet's responses were direct revelation from Allah rather than examples of human analogical reasoning. The comparison to debts served as an explanation to help the questioners understand the ruling, not as a demonstration of the process by which the ruling was derived.
To support their argument, they point to instances where prophetic rulings contradicted what Qiyas would suggest. For example, the Prophet (ﷺ) prohibited eating donkey meat but allowed horse meat, though both animals serve similar transportation purposes. Such divergences from what analogical reasoning would conclude indicate that prophetic rulings were based on revelation rather than human reasoning processes.
Arguments from Hadith Against Qiyas
Opponents of Qiyas also cite several hadiths to support their position:
1. The Hadith About the Death of Scholars
The Prophet ﷺ said:
"Allah does not take away knowledge by snatching it from the people, but He takes away knowledge by taking away the scholars. When no scholar remains, people will take ignorant ones as their leaders, who, when asked, will give verdict without knowledge, thus misguiding themselves and others."
It is reported that Abdullah ibn Amr ibn Al-'Aas said:
"Bani Israel remained upon truth until the sons of prisoners of war (who were taken captive) became numerous among them. These people gave rulings based on opinion (ra'i) and misguided others."
(Al-Nabdha al-Kafiya of Ibn Hazm p.59).
Ibn Hazm cited a version of this hadith with the explicit mention of "reasoning" (ra'i) as the basis for these misguided verdicts, suggesting that reliance on human reasoning (which would include Qiyas) leads to misguidance.
2. The Statement of Ali ibn Abi Talib
Abd Khayr reported: Ali ibn Abi Talib, may Allah be pleased with him, said:
“If the religion were based upon one’s opinion, one might expect the bottom of the leather sock to be wiped instead of the top. I have seen the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, wiping over the upper part of his leather socks.” (Sunan Abu Daawood 162).
This statement refers to the practice of masah (wiping) over leather socks during ablution. According to the Sunnah, one wipes the top part of the socks, not the bottom, even though logically, the bottom part gets dirtier and seems more deserving of being wiped.
Ali used this example to show that analytical reasoning (like Qiyas) cannot be a reliable method for deriving rulings.
3. The Statement of Umar ibn Al-Khattab
Umar ibn Al-Khattab (RA) reportedly said:
Verily, the followers of opinion (Ashaab al-Rai) are the enemies of the Sunan (Ahadith of Allah’s Messenger): they were unable to preserve them and their meanings escaped them, and when asked [questions] they were too embarrassed to say ‘We don’t know,’ so they opposed the Sunan with their opinions. (Ibn Hazm in Mulakhass Ibtal al-Qiyas wa-al-Ray wa-al-Istihan wa al-Taqleed wa al-Taleel p.58, and Ibn Abee Zamanin, Uṣool Al-Sunnah article 8)
The Response of Qiyas Proponents
Scholars who support Qiyas respond that these narrations are referring to flawed or arbitrary reasoning that contradicts the Quran and Sunnah, not to systematic and principled Qiyas. They distinguish between:
- Qiyas Sahih (Sound Analogy) - Which is based on clear textual evidence and follows established methodological principles
- Qiyas Fasid (Flawed Analogy) - Which contradicts clear texts or is based on arbitrary reasoning
They argue that the criticism in these narrations is directed at Qiyas Fasid, not at Qiyas Sahih.
Ibn Al-Qayyim elaborates on this point in his book I'lam Al-Muwaqqi'in, explaining that all the narrations from the Salaf criticizing ra'i (opinion) and Qiyas refer to analogies that contradict the Quran and Sunnah. He notes that the companions themselves practiced sound Qiyas, as evidenced by Umar's letter to Abu Musa Al-Ash'ari.
Evidence from Ijma (Consensus)
The Proponents' View: Some scholars claim there was a consensus (Ijma) among the early Muslim community regarding the validity of Qiyas.
- Al-Muzani, a student of Imam Al-Shafi'i, reportedly stated that from the time of the Prophet (ﷺ) until his own era, Muslims unanimously permitted the use of Qiyas, and no one opposed it. (A’lam al-Muwaqqieen (1/157))
- Ibn Qudamah said: There was an Ijmaa (consensus) of Sahabah to use Qiyaas (in absence of texts from Quran and Sunnah). (Rawdah al-Naadhir 3/809)
The Opponents' View: Ibn Hazm aggressively refutes these claims of consensus, characterizing them as "unfounded and aggressive" with "no basis." He says:
As for consensus on Qiyas, Ibn Hazm extensively addresses the question at hand, dedicating a significant portion of his writings to the topic. Ibn Hazm dismisses these claims as unfounded and aggressive, asserting that there is no basis in reality for such assertions. Acknowledging that companions occasionally rendered legal decisions based on personal opinions (ray), Ibn Hazm vehemently denies any instances where they employed analogical deduction (Qiyas) during the Prophet's ﷺ lifetime. He argues that, to his knowledge, none of the companions is recorded to have issued a legal decision through analogy while in the company of the Prophet ﷺ.
(Ibn Hazm in Mulakhass Ibtal al-Qiyas wa-al-Ray wa-al-Istihan wa al-Taqleed wa al-Taleel p.5-6) and also in al-Ikhkaam fee Usool al-Ahkaam.)
Evidence from Companions Practice
The Proponents' View: One of the strongest pieces of evidence for the validity of Qiyas comes from a letter that Umar ibn Al-Khattab (RA) wrote to Abu Musa Al-Ash'ari, which states:
“Scrutinize each issue which you are unsure about, where there is no text in the Qur’an and Sunnah, by drawing analogies (Qiyas) and seeking what is most pleasing to Allah and closest to the truth.” (Sunan al-Kubra by al-Bayhaqi no. 20537 (10/135), Sunan al-Daraqutni no. 4431)
This letter, which is reported in Sunan al-Kubra of Al-Bayhaqi and Sunan al-Daraqutni, provides concrete evidence that at least some Companions endorsed Qiyas when direct textual guidance was unavailable.
The Opponents' View: Ibn Hazm rejected the authenticity of this narration, claiming it was not authentic. (Mulakhass Ibtal al-Qiyas wa-al-Ray wa-al-Istihan wa al-Taqleed wa al-Taleel p.5-6)
However, most hadith scholars, including Sheikh Al-Albani in his book "Irwa Al-Ghalil," have authenticated this letter and confirmed its chain of transmission is sound. (For detailed Takhreej and authentication, refer to al-Irwa al-Ghaleel of al-Albani (8/241-242))
Ibn Qayyim said: It is unanimously accepted by scholars. A’laam al-Muwaqqieen of Ibn al-Qayyim (1/69-87)
Therefore, while some may dispute the claimed consensus among Companions, this authenticated letter provides strong evidence that at least Umar radiallahuanhu, one of the most knowledgeable and respected Companions, endorsed a form of analogical reasoning in legal matters. Here is the full text of the letter for those interested in reading it:
In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. From the humble servant of Allah, the son of al Khattab, Ameerul Muminin, to Abdullah Ibn Qays (Abu Musa al Ashari), May peace be upon you.
Administering justice is an established obligation and a path to be followed. Endeavor to comprehend the cases brought before you, as it is futile for a person to present his case if it is not understood. Address people impartially, ensuring no noble person expects unfair bias, and no weak individual despairs of justice. The burden of proof lies with the plaintiff, and an oath is required from the one who denies it. It is permissible to negotiate deals between Muslims, except those that permit what is forbidden or forbid what is permitted. If you render a judgment today but upon reflection find a different conclusion, do not hesitate to return to the truth. Truth is eternal, and rectifying a mistake is superior to persisting in falsehood.
- Scrutinize each issue which you are unsure about, where there is no text in the Qur’an and Sunnah, by drawing analogies (Qiyas) and seeking what is most pleasing to Allah and closest to the truth. When someone claims dues from another, set a time limit for evidence. If provided, restore rights; otherwise, suggest dropping the claim to eliminate doubt. Muslims are inherently of good character, barring those lashed as a hadd punishment or known for false witness. Allah is aware of hidden hearts. Judgments must rely on evidence and oaths. Guard against impatience, for just judgment brings immense rewards from Allah. Whoever harbors a good intention and self-reflects, Allah will suffice for him. But one who displays a false attitude known to Allah will be exposed. Consider the rewards of Allah in this world and the Hereafter. And peace be upon you. (Sunan al-Kubra by al-Bayhaqi no. 20537(10/135), Sunan al-Daraqutni no. 4431). Ibn Qayyim said: Its unanimously accepted by scholars. A’laam al-Muwaqqieen of Ibn al-Qayyim (1/69-87). For detailed Takhreej and authentication, refer to al-Irwa al-Ghaleel of al-Albani (8/241-242)
The Zahiri Claim: Qiyas as an Innovation
One of the central claims made by Ibn Hazm and other Zahiri scholars was that Qiyas was a later innovation (bid'ah) that was not practiced during the time of the Prophet ﷺ, the Companions, or the early generations of Muslims (Salaf).
According to Ibn Hazm: It (Qiyas) is an innovation that came into existence during the second century A.H. but it became widespread and well-established in the third century A.H. (Ibn Hazm in Mulakhass Ibtal al-Qiyas wa-al-Ray wa-al-Istihan wa al-Taqleed wa al-Taleel p.5)
However, this claim has been contested by many scholars. Imam Al-Dhahabi, one of the great scholars of hadith and history, wrote notes on Ibn Hazm's book Mulaqqas Ibtal Al-Qiyas in which he rejected this assertion, stating that Qiyas was indeed established and practiced during the time of the Companions.
The First Qiyas - Iblis's Analogy
An argument raised by opponents of Qiyas is the claim that the first being to use Qiyas was Iblis (Satan) when he refused to prostrate to Adam. This view is established from a number of Tabi'in (successors to the companions), including Ibn Sirin and others.
When commanded by Allah to prostrate to Adam, Iblis responded:
"I am better than him. You created me from fire and created him from clay." (Quran 7:12)
Iblis used what appeared to be an analogy: since fire is superior to clay, he (created from fire) should be superior to Adam (created from clay) and therefore should not have to prostrate to him. This analogy led him to disobey Allah's direct command.
Ibn Sirin said:
That Iblis was the first to employ Qiyas, and implied that without Qiyas, the sun and moon might not have been objects of worship. (Ibn Hazm in Mulakhass p 70 and Ibn Hazm quotes number of reports in Mulakhass p 57-72 from Sahabah and Tabieen) condemning Qiyas.
His point was that people worshipped celestial objects based on their own reasoning and analogies rather than objective divine command.
The Response of Qiyas Proponents: Proponents of Qiyas argue that Iblis's analogy was fundamentally flawed because it contradicted a clear command from Allah. Iblis's error was not in using analogy per se, but in using it to justify disobedience to a clear command from Allah.
Ibn Hazm's Argument Against Constructive Dilemma Of Qiyas
Ibn Hazm presents an interesting challenge to proponents of Qiyas in his book Al-Ihkam fi Usul Al-Ahkam:
What do you say about a person who said in his lifetime or at the time of his death: "Set my slave Maymun free because he is dark-skinned,", and he has many dark-skinned slaves? Would you set all of them free because of the reason of them being dark-skinned, which is shared among all those slaves, which he(the owner) made as an 'illah for setting Maymun free, because of doing qiyas upon Maymun? Or would you not set any of them free except Maymun only? So if you say: "We would set them free," you contradict your fatawa and you oppose the ijmaa’, and if you say: "We would not set them free,” you have left your view of going according to 'ilal and qiyās, and you have returned to our view.
To explain this simply, imagine a wealthy man who, before his death, instructs: "Set my slave free because of his dark skin." After his death, it's discovered that he owned multiple dark-skinned slaves.
Ibn Hazm poses this dilemma: If you apply Qiyas based on the 'illa (effective cause) of "dark skin," would you free all the dark-skinned slaves or only Maymoon?
He argues:
- If you free all dark-skinned slaves, you contradict your own consensus that only Maymoon should be freed
- If you free only Maymoon, you've abandoned your principle of following the 'illa in Qiyas and effectively accepted the Zahiri position
This challenge attempts to highlight what Ibn Hazm saw as inconsistencies in the application of Qiyas.
How do rejectors of Qiyas derive rulings in new cases?
While Zahiris rejected analogical reasoning (Qiyas), they were not against all forms of reasoning to derive rulings for new cases. They distinguished between:
- Analogical Reasoning (Qiyas) - Where one uses their judgment to identify the 'illa (effective cause) of a ruling and extends it to a new case. Qiyas (analogical reasoning) employs inductive logic, starting with a specific ruling, attempting to infer the illah (reason or cause), and then applying this Illah to analyze and determine the ruling for a new specific case.
- Deductive Reasoning - Where one applies general principles and commands directly from texts without trying to identify specific causes. Aql, or deductive reasoning, involves beginning with a general principle derived from the Quran or Sunnah and subsequently applying it to deduce a specific ruling for a particular case falling under that general principle.
For example, if the Quran or Sunnah established a general principle, Zahiris would apply this principle to new situations directly. They rejected the intermediate step of identifying and analyzing the 'illa that is central to Qiyas.
Conclusion: Revelation vs. Necessity
Ibn Al-Qayyim, in his book I'lam Al-Muwaqqi'in, offers a balanced assessment of this debate, saying:
“And the intended point is that all of the Salaf blamed Rai (opinion) and Qiyas which contradicted the Book (Quran) and the Sunnah, and believed that it is not allowed to act on it, neither in giving Fatwa, nor judicial rulings; and that the most that can be said about Ra’y (opinion) that is not known to contradict the Book (Quran) and the Sunnah, nor coincide with it, is that it is justified to act on it in case of necessity, without making it binding, nor objecting to anyone who opposes it. (Alam al-Muwaqqieen 1/61)
Ibn Al-Qayyim's words cut through the noise of this debate and provide a very nuanced, yet important conclusion. He mentions that the Salaf permitted reasoned opinion only when absolutely necessary - and even then, without forcing it on others as it cannot be binding. This isn't academic hairsplitting; it's about keeping revelation central while acknowledging we sometimes face situations not explicitly addressed in texts.
In our next article, inshaAllah, we will examine other methods of ijtihad beyond Qiyas, that is istihsaan.
